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a b s t r a c t
In Norway two concepts in risk assessment and management – risikoforståelse and risikoerkjennelse –
have recently been given much attention, particularly in the oil and gas industry and in societal safety
and security contexts. The former concept corresponds quite well to ‘risk understanding’ but the latter
does not have an exact counterpart in English – the best term seems to be ‘risk acknowledgement’. The
discourse related to these two concepts has given us new general insights concerning the risk concept
and its practical use, and the purpose of the present paper is to point to and discuss the main
observations made. A main conclusion of the paper is that justiﬁed beliefs – what we refer to as
knowledge – and the processes of generating these beliefs is an essential feature of both these concepts.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In the discourse on risk assessment and management in Norway
the concepts of risikoforståelse and risikoerkjennelse are frequently
used. The counterpart in English for risikoforståelse is ‘risk under-
standing’ but there is no clear candidate for the risikoerkjennelse
term. The closest term seems to be ‘risk acknowledgement’. These
concepts have recently been given much attention, in particular in
the oil and gas industry and within societal safety and security. For
the remainder of this paper we will write ‘risk understanding’ for
risikoforståelse and ‘risk acknowledgement’ for risikoerkjennelse.
Accident investigation reports in the oil and gas industry frequently
use “deﬁcient ‘risk understanding’” as a causal explanation of why
adverse events could happen. One example is found in [23]: An
unsecured anchor created holes in the hull of a mobile accommodation
unit leading to instability. The investigation report stated: “The inves-
tigation identiﬁed breaches of the regulations related to […] deﬁcient
‘risk understanding’ and compliance with requirements”. Another
example is found in [22], where a worker suffered a serious shoulder
injury during the installation of a hydraulic lift cylinder on a drilling rig:
“Our general impression after the investigation is that the incident was
partly due to a lack of planning and inadequate ‘risk understanding’”.
In the report of the 22 July Commission following the terror
attacks on the government quarter in Oslo and on the island of Utøya
in 2011, lack of ‘risk understanding’ and ‘risk acknowledgement’ by
the authorities and the police was highlighted as an important reason
for the consequences being so severe; a total of 77 people were killed
and several hundred injured. The report states that “Different ‘risk
understanding’ – or, more accurately: different ‘risk acknowledge-
ment’ [among the authorities] – stand out as one important explana-
tion. Our review has revealed a number of circumstances where the
‘risk acknowledgement’ was not sufﬁcient” [21]. In the Commission’s
concluding chapter, the following recommendation is being made for
measures at the national level: “The Commission's most important
recommendation is that leaders at all levels of the administration
work systematically to strengthen their own and their organisations'
fundamental attitudes and culture in respect of ‘risk acknowledge-
ment’ […]” [21].
Despite their widespread use, it is not immediately clear how
the concepts of ‘risk understanding’ and ‘risk acknowledgement’
should be interpreted; precise and unambiguous deﬁnitions of
these terms do not exist. Junge ([18]) investigates the ‘risk under-
standing’ concept in the petroleum industry. She ﬁnds that the
term ‘deﬁcient risk understanding’ is being used in a multitude of
ways, ranging from lack of communication, lack of compliance
with requirements, missing or inadequate risk assessment, lack of
competence, or sheer thoughtlessness. From her analysis we can
deduce that: adequate ‘risk understanding’ requires a risk assess-
ment, and that the results of this assessment must be properly
communicated; prerequisites for good ‘risk understanding’ are
adequate expertise and training; and, ‘risk understanding’ man-
ifests itself at the individual level by the individual offshore
worker, but also at the system and organisational levels.
Within the societal safety and security domain, the ‘risk under-
standing’ term is used in a similar way: “Preventing and managing
serious incidents in a professional manner assumes that those in charge
gain knowledge about the risks they face and actively adapt their
behavior accordingly. ‘Risk understanding’ helps determine which
initiatives are taken and helps determine the dimensions of the security
and emergency preparedness that society chooses to have” [21, p. 451].
In addition, “accurate ‘risk understanding’ is developed over time by
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compiling knowledge about the likelihood that various scenarios will
arise, and the consequences of different outcomes” [21, p. 451]. We see
that ‘risk understanding’ is interpreted as knowledge of the risks one is
facing, that such knowledge may take time to acquire, and that
adequate ‘risk understanding’ is a prerequisite for proper risk mitiga-
tion. Furthermore, ‘risk understanding’ forms the basis for dimensioning
of safety and emergency preparedness measures.
The discourse on ‘risk acknowledgement’ indicates that this
means something deeper than ‘risk understanding’, that ‘risk
acknowledgement’ is something that is achieved after the knowledge
about risk has sunk in: “If you as a private individual discover that
your roof may leak in the winter, you will repair it now. If you see
that the wheel of your car is about to detach, you will attach it. You
do not want to live with a detected risk, but will eliminate it as soon
as possible. This is ‘risk acknowledgement’” [11]. The impression is
that ‘risk acknowledgement’ triggers action, as is further illustrated
by the following quotation taken from the Governmental White
Paper on terror ([15]): “The authorities had knowledge about the risk
and threat pictures but were not able to take action based on the
knowledge that was available. They lacked ‘risk acknowledgement’”.
The present paper provides a thorough discussion of the ‘risk
understanding’ and ‘risk acknowledgement’ concepts – with a focus
on the implications for practical risk assessment and management.
We will argue that:
1) Risk assessment is, to a large extent, about gaining ‘risk
understanding’ in the sense of knowledge – justiﬁed beliefs
2) ‘Risk acknowledgement’ is of special importance and challen-
ging in the case when it is difﬁcult to calculate risk with some
precision (typical in the case of large or deep uncertainties).
For the sake of the present study we distinguish between two
main lines of thinking about risk [6]:
a) Risk¼(C,p), where C is the consequences of the activity studied
and p is the associated probability which is understood as an
objective propensity of this activity. Risk is assessed by specify-
ing the consequences C0 and estimating p by pn or expressing
the uncertainty about p using a measure of uncertainty,
typically a subjective probability P.
b) Risk¼(C,U), where C is the consequences of the activity studied,
and U refers to uncertainty: the consequences C are not known.
Risk is described by (C0,Q,K), where C0 are the speciﬁed conse-
quences of C, Q a measure of uncertainty (typically a subjective
probability P), and K is the background knowledge on which C0
and Q are based.
In Section 2 we discuss the meaning of the ‘risk understanding’
concept in relation to these two interpretations of risk, and in
Section 3 we do the same for the ‘risk acknowledgement’ concept.
Then in Section 4 we address the above two theses (1) and (2) in
view of the analysis conducted in Sections 2 and 3. Finally, Section
5 provides some overall discussion and conclusions.
2. The meaning of the ‘risk understanding’ concept
The Norwegian word risikoforståelse (‘risk understanding’) is
composed of two words: risiko (risk) and forståelse (understand-
ing). The origin of the Norwegianword forståelse is the Middle Low
German word vorstān, literally meaning “stand before something
(to investigate it)” and is analogous to the English word understand
[10], which can be interpreted as to grasp or comprehend, or have
insights about.
Having an interpretation of risk in line with (a) as deﬁned in the
previous section, the term ‘risk understanding’ can be seen as having
knowledge about the true risk, about the underlying probabilities p
which are presumed to characterise the activity. This knowledge may
for example be a result of having a large amount of relevant data
believed to provide accurate estimates of the p’s. ‘Risk understanding’
could also mean having knowledge about which aspects of the
system or activity that contribute the most to the risk.
However, for interpretation (b), there is no true risk characterisation
and such an interpretation of ‘risk understanding’ cannot be used. We
need a broader perspective, and let us start from the general expression
for how risk is described (C0,Q,K). The ‘risk understanding’ needs to be
seen in relation to all of these three elements. Let us ﬁrst consider C0.
If the analysts have a good ‘risk understanding’ they knowwhat
types of events may occur, and what type of consequences they
could lead to. They have models that can accurately predict the
consequences given the occurrences of speciﬁc events. The ana-
lysts would have a poor ‘risk understanding’ if they are not aware
of all types of hazards (for example a hazardous situation known
by others in the organisation but not by the risk analysts) or the
available models do not provide accurate predictions.
Next let us consider the measure of uncertainty Q. If the
analysts have a good ‘risk understanding’
They are able to use Q to express the uncertainties and beliefs
about the consequences C0 on the basis of the background knowledge
K. For example, if probability P is used, the analysts have a clear
interpretation of this probability, stating for instance the meaning of
a statement like P(A)¼0.1, and how the probabilities are to be
assigned based on models, data and expert judgements. The analysts
also know how to carry out calculations using the measure Q. If
probability is used to represent variation (frequentist probabilities
and probability models), the analysts know how to relate these to P.
Finally, we have the background knowledge K. If the analysts have
a good ‘risk understanding’, sufﬁcient relevant data and information
about the events and consequences must be available. The analysts
must use models that are considered adequate for their purpose. This
background knowledge must be considered to be strong.
In addition, we would require that a good ‘risk understanding’
also implies that the analysts understand what the overall risk
results (C0,Q,K) say, what the limitations are, and how they can be
meaningfully applied.
Hence the analysts should be able to provide justiﬁcations for, for
example, which aspects of the systems or activity that contribute the
most to the risk, where the largest potential for improvements with
respect to risk are, etc. Different types of importance measures can be
used for this purpose (as discussed by e.g. [9,8]).
As an example, think of a potential bus accident, and let C0 denote
the number of fatalities. Assume risk is expressed by the expected
number of fatalities EC0. Here we may have a good ‘risk under-
standing’ with respect to C0, as we know the variability in the actual
number of fatalities of a bus accident, ranging from, say, 0 to 40
casualties, and the underlying phenomena (road conditions, technical
features of the bus, the different causes leading up to the accident,
etc.) are well understood. We may also have a strong background
knowledge leading to a good ‘risk understanding’ with respect to K,
but the use of E C0 to express risk would, however, result in a poor
‘risk understanding’ when it comes to Q. The problem is that
important aspects of variation and uncertainty are not adequately
reﬂected using this metric (see [6]).
This broad perspective on ‘risk understanding’ can also apply to
the risk deﬁnition (a), if we focus on uncertainty measures of p and
also highlight the background knowledge K.
3. The meaning of the ‘risk acknowledgement’ concept
Risikoerkjennelse (‘risk acknowledgement’) is composed of the two
words risiko (‘risk’) and erkjennelse (‘acknowledgement’). Erkjennelse
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is borrowed from the German word Erkenntnis [10], which is
translated into English as awareness, ﬁnding, insight, perception,
realisation, cognition, or knowledge [20]. According to Aristotle and
the ancient Greek theory of phronesis, forståelse (‘understanding’)
precedes or is a prerequisite for true, practical erkjennelse (‘acknowl-
edgement’) [26].
Thus, to make a decision about risk, we ﬁrst need ‘risk under-
standing’ then ‘risk acknowledgement’. The ‘risk acknowledgement’
takes the risk to heart and accepts the situation (i) and draws the
necessary conclusions (ii). The term ‘risk acknowledgement’ thus sees
beyond ‘risk response’ with its emphasis on also the ﬁrst element (i).
Consider for example a situation where we have a good ‘risk under-
standing’ as a result of having strong knowledge about the true risk
(perspective (a)). Then the ‘risk acknowledgement’ is about accepting
this risk, and making the necessary conclusions and actions. However,
in other cases, the meaning of ‘risk acknowledgement’ is not so clear.
The risk estimates could be subject to large uncertainties and, in the
case of perspective (b), the basic idea of ‘risk acknowledgement’ may
be challenged as there is no reference to an “objective” magnitude of
the risk. However, it is still possible to interpret ‘risk acknowledge-
ment’ as in case (a) – expressing that if the risk assessment provides
strong conﬁdence of severe consequences C, ‘risk acknowledgement’
is again about accepting the risk, and making the necessary conclu-
sions and actions. Poor ‘risk understanding’ could, however, compli-
cate these considerations, as will be discussed in the coming section.
4. Two theses about the ‘risk understanding’ and ‘risk
acknowledgement’ concepts
In this section we discuss the two theses formulated in Section 1.
4.1. Risk assessment is to a large extent about gaining ‘risk
understanding’ in the sense of knowledge – justiﬁed beliefs
The analysis of the term ‘risk understanding’ in Section 2
revealed that knowledge is a key feature of this concept. But what
is knowledge?
It is common to distinguish between three types of knowledge as:
know-how (skill), know-that of propositional knowledge, and acquain-
tance knowledge [19]. “Knowing how to ride a bike” is an example of
know-how, and the statement “I know that Oslo is the capital of
Norway” is an example of propositional knowledge, while “I know
John” is an instance of the acquaintance knowledge. Here our interest is
in propositional knowledge but also in aspects of know-how.
The knowledge can be based on data (D) and information (I).
Data can be viewed as symbolic representation of observable
properties of the world [25], for example the occurrence times of
some type of events, whereas information can be seen as relevant,
or usable, or meaningful, or processed, data [25]. Information can
be inferred from data on the number of events of a speciﬁc type,
for example the average value, some illustrations showing the
trend over time, etc. The idea is that of a human asking a question
beginning with, “who”, “what”, “where”, “when”, or “how many”
[1, p. 3]; and the data is processed into an answer [14]. When this
happens, the data becomes “information”.
The traditional perspective states that (propositional) knowl-
edge is justiﬁed true beliefs. This meaning of knowledge is the
point of departure for most text books on knowledge. However,
this deﬁnition can be challenged, and here we consider knowledge
to be justiﬁed beliefs. Who decides what is “true” and how?
Consider the following example. You have a die and you argue that
the frequentist probability that the outcome will be i (i¼1,2,3,…,
6) is 1/6 due to symmetry. You have some justiﬁed beliefs, but you
do not necessarily possess the truth – the long run frequency of
outcomes showing i. No-one knows the truth, still we have some
“knowledge”, we would argue. It is indeed recognised as knowl-
edge, if knowledge is justiﬁed beliefs, but not if knowledge is
justiﬁed true beliefs.
Here are some other examples. A risk analysis group may have
strong knowledge about how a system works and can provide strong
arguments why it will not fail over the next year, but it cannot know
for sure whether or not it will in fact fail. Nobody can. The group’s
beliefs can, for example, be expressed through a probability. As
another example, consider a case where a group of experts believe
that a systemwill not be able to withstand a speciﬁc load. Their belief
is based on data and information, modelling and analysis, but they can
be wrong. The system could be able to withstand this load. As a ﬁnal
example, is it true that the (frequentist) probability of a fatal accident
in a process plant is higher than 1104 even if a large amount of
data shows this and all experts agree on it? Leaving aside the issue
that such probabilities may be difﬁcult to deﬁne, we cannot say that
we have a true belief that this probability is so large, as the probability
is unknown. We can have a strong belief and we can even introduce
probabilities (subjective) to express the strength of the belief.
Following this line of thinking, knowledge cannot be objective,
as a belief is someone’s belief. In general, knowledge then needs to
be considered as subjective or at best inter-subjective among
people, for example experts.
From such a view the term ‘justiﬁed’ becomes critical. Philoso-
phers and others have discussed the issue since ancient times. It is
commonly linked to being a result of a reliable process, a process
that generally is believed to produce true beliefs. It applies to the
justiﬁcation of a speciﬁc statement by an individual and the broad
justiﬁcation of scientiﬁc theses. In line with Hansson ([16]), the
perspective taken here is that science is a means to produce
knowledge in this sense:
Science (in the broad sense) is the practice that provides us
with the most reliable (i.e. epistemically most warranted) state-
ments that can be made, at the time being, on subject matter
covered by the community of knowledge disciplines, i.e. on nature,
ourselves as human beings, our societies, our physical construc-
tions, and our thought constructions [16].
In addition, criteria such as scientiﬁc fruitfulness and explana-
tory power need to be applied to determine scientiﬁc quality [17].
Risk assessment is about generating justiﬁed beliefs, through
processes that are considered reliable. Through testing, experi-
mentation and analysis, strong justiﬁed beliefs can for example be
derived about what load a system is able to withstand, but there
will always be some uncertainties/variations making it impossible
to refer to a “true” strength of the system.
Here is another example, from the oil and gas industry:
The hydrocarbon leak at Ula on 12 September 2012. The direct
cause of the leak was a fracture of the bolts that held together a
valve in the outlet of the separator. Because of sweating in the
valve, the bolts were exposed to produced water with a high
content of chlorides and a temperature of 120 1 C. This resulted in
chlorine-induced corrosion which weakened the bolts so that they
eventually broke.
Sweating outside the valve was discovered on 29 March 2012. A
risk assessment was conducted and it was concluded that the valve
could be replaced during the maintenance shutdown in the
summer of 2013. A prerequisite for the choice of material in the
valve bolts is that they do not come in contact with the medium
(produced water). When sweating in the valve was discovered, this
assumption was not followed up in the organisation. The people
who were involved in the review and the subsequent decision-
making were not aware of previous experience with this type of
corrosion, and/or were not aware of the requirement that the valve
bolts should not come in contact with produced water.
There had previously been similar corrosion problems on Ula, and
the issue of corrosion in relation to produced water was known to
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the operator. In 2008 there was an incident on Ula, in which two of
the four bolts were damaged due to the same corrosion mechanism.
Measures were not established to ensure that this knowledge and
experience associated with sweating were included in the risk
assessments, and the relevant experience was not used in the
assessment of the speciﬁc sweating problem on Ula.
The risk judgements carried out can be said to be characterised by
a poor ‘risk understanding’ as the sweating problem was not known
to them. Their beliefs were not sufﬁciently justiﬁed. The belief-
generating process was not reliable. The example highlights the need
for clarifying to whom the concept of good ‘risk understanding’
relates; is it the operational team, the company, the industry, or the
total scientiﬁc community? We return to this issue in Section 5.
The example illustrates that ‘risk understanding’ is often very
much about system understanding. Also, for system understanding,
we are led to justiﬁed beliefs, as what is “true” is not always clear, in
particular before decisions are made and the outcomes observed. The
case with the strength of the system in relation to a load provides an
example. However, for the Ula event, it can be argued that there is a
“true” system understanding on the company level, in the sense that
it provides better predictions of the system performance. However, a
cautious and humble attitude is needed for seeing the truth, as the
company insights could also have limitations in seeing how all the
various parameters of the process interact.
Risk assessment is about gaining ‘risk understanding’ in the sense
of knowledge – justiﬁed beliefs. The key is the justiﬁcation process.
The scientiﬁc ﬁeld of risk assessment works on improving these
processes. Developments are made continuously; as reported in
scientiﬁc journals and at scientiﬁc conferences.
4.2. ‘Risk acknowledgement’ is of special importance and challenging
in the case when it is difﬁcult to calculate risk with some precision
(typical in the case of large or deep uncertainties)
We remember from Section 2 that if the risk assessment
provides strong conﬁdence of severe consequences, ‘risk acknowl-
edgement’ is about accepting the risk and making the necessary
conclusions and actions. However, we can never have strong
conﬁdence in the case of large/deep uncertainties, which we
experience in relation to, for example, complex systems such as
offshore drilling operations, or in preparing for climate change and
managing emerging diseases. Such situations are characterised by
a lack of models that can accurately predict the system perfor-
mance. What is ‘risk acknowledgement’ in such a case?
‘Risk acknowledgement’ means taking the risk to heart, accept-
ing the situation and drawing the necessary conclusions. However,
deﬁnition (a), with its focus on the true risk, is difﬁcult to use as
the true risk is not known and the uncertainties are so large. On
the other hand, with the broader approach to risk, covering (C0,Q,
K), it is still possible to think about “taking the risk to the heart”, as
the risk is characterised by descriptions of the uncertainties and
the knowledge. We may not have strong conﬁdence of severe
consequences, but there could be a potential for such conse-
quences even if the beliefs are not strong. The background knowl-
edge supporting the beliefs could be weak. The adequate response
in the case of such situations is, however, not always straightfor-
ward, as the evidence is not clear. It is a matter of giving weight to
weakly founded judgements and uncertainties.
Think about the above oil and gas example (Ula). The risk
analysts planning an operation may be conﬁdent that there is no
problem and advise no further analyses. The risk is considered low
and they could even have strong conﬁdence of not experiencing
severe outcomes. However, having the broader knowledge basis of
the company, the risk is recognised as high and actions are needed.
The company in this case had a poor ‘risk acknowledgement’, as
the risk understanding was good on this level, but the necessary
conclusions and actions were not taken.
5. Discussion and conclusions
Following the above discussion, and using the risk perspective
(b) (C,U), a risk assessment contributes to obtain a ‘risk under-
standing’ by producing a risk description (C0,Q,K). Here K covers
the background knowledge that supports C0 and Q, the know-how
(for example how to use subjective probabilities to quantify risk)
and justiﬁed beliefs. These beliefs are based on data, information
and models. The uncertainty judgments about C0 using Q can also
be seen as justiﬁed beliefs. In the following discussion we relate
these concepts and ideas to current practice of risk assessments.
We point to some challenges, in particular for the case of large/
deep uncertainties. We question when the ‘risk understanding’ can
be considered good or strong. Can we formulate some criteria for
what is a good ‘risk understanding’? We argue that strength of
knowledge considerations is a useful tool for this purpose and we
point to some aspects that such considerations should cover.
The above summary of ideas and concepts can also apply to the
risk deﬁnition (a) (C,p), if we focus on uncertainty measures of p
and also highlight the background knowledge K.
In the examples mentioned in Section 1, the evaluation reports
pointed to poor and deﬁcient ‘risk understanding’. Interpreting ‘risk
understanding’ as justiﬁed beliefs related to risk issues as discussed in
Section 4, the key term to study and reﬂect on is ‘justiﬁed beliefs’.
With hindsight it is always easy to see what the right beliefs are, but at
the decision point, when we are facing a huge number of signals and
warnings for something that may or may not occur, it is much more
difﬁcult. The uncertainties are often large. The risk assessments are not
able to accurately express how systems will work, what events will
occur and what their consequences will be. The justiﬁed beliefs then
take more the form of hypotheses on how the world will behave. The
way risk is presented, communicated and managed needs to reﬂect
this. The risk assessment shows judgements made by the analysts
conditional on some background knowledge and assumptions, and
both the analysts and the decision makers need to understand this
and let it affect the risk management and decision making. The
analysts must ﬁnd the balance between reporting with conﬁdence
what their risk assessment has found, and at the same time be
humble – the assessment has limitations and the judgements made
may have overlooked important aspects and be based on erroneous
assumptions and beliefs.
Current risk analysis practice only to some extent meets this need.
We commonly see a rather mechanical decision-making process
based on risk assessment results reporting computed probabilities
(see e.g. [24,5]). In many cases, risk acceptance criteria are used to
provide prescriptions on how to manage the risk. This practice
matches a perspective where a true risk can be produced and a
good ‘risk understanding’ means that this true risk is basically
known. However, it is never known – we may also reject such a
true state – as we do when adopting the (C,U) perspective – it is
acknowledged that the ‘risk understanding’will always be limited. So
we may then ask: when is the ‘risk understanding’ “good enough”,
when is it poor and unacceptable?
There is of course no clear answer to these questions. Some
criteria can, however, be deﬁned that could be used as a checklist
for ensuring a high level of ‘risk understanding’:
1) Do the relevant analysis personnel have the necessary general
competence for conducting the analysis in an adequate way?
2) Are relevant in-house experts consulted?
3) Are relevant external experts consulted?
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4) Is the analysis conducted in line with the current methods and
procedures?
5) Is the strength of knowledge supporting the risk judgements
sufﬁciently strong?
6) Are the current methods and procedures sufﬁciently info-
rmative?
Concerning item (1), it is a challenge for risk analysis that both
system knowledge and risk analysis methodology are required. Few
people have both competences. The system knowledge is the key, but
if the concepts and methodology are not properly understood and
rooted, misconceptions are often the result. An example is the use of
risk matrices, and this also applies to item (6). Probabilities are
assigned for speciﬁc events, the consequences estimated, and rules
are speciﬁed for what is unacceptable and acceptable risk based on
the scores determined [12,4]. Although the strength of the back-
ground knowledge and the assumptions on which these judgements
are based are often discussed during the execution of the analysis,
the method itself and the practice guide the decision making in a
way that cannot be scientiﬁcally justiﬁed. The determined probabil-
ities and expected values should not alone prescribe what to do. Such
a practice is not justiﬁed beliefs, according to the science of risk
analysis. Yet the practice is so common. A general competence lift in
risk analysis is needed to meet the black box risk-based thinking,
which relates risk to numbers alone and does not inform sufﬁciently
about the context, the limitations of the numbers to represent and
express risk, as well as the knowledge and assumptions on which
these judgements and numbers are founded. It is beyond the scope
of the present paper to discuss in depth this type of fundamental
problems for the risk ﬁeld, but they are considered critical for the
ability to establish a proper ‘risk understanding’.
We experienced this issue very clearly in relation to the 22 July
incidents. The evaluation following the events was based on a
probability and expected value approach to risk, to a large extent
in line with perspective (a), as described in Section 2, and the
various actors’ ‘risk understanding’ was questioned on the basis of
such a perspective. The uncertainty component of risk was not
given much attention; the uncertainties were not sufﬁciently
acknowledged, the result being rather strong conclusions about
various actors not having a proper ‘risk understanding’ and ‘risk
acknowledgement’, as mentioned in Section 1.
We discussed this case in [2], and wewill not repeat all the details
here, just stress that the fundamental concepts and principles
adopted very much inﬂuence the way risk is assessed and managed.
Items (1) and (6) are therefore critical and need to be underlined
when discussing what a high level of ‘risk understanding’ means.
Items (2) and (3) seem obvious, but many examples (like the
Ula one mentioned in Section 4.1) show that they are highly
relevant. They are linked to the type of unknown knowns type of
risk as studied in relation to the black swan metaphor (see [7]).
Some people have the knowledge, but the analysis group does not.
In the Ula case some people in the organisation had the insights
but these were not transferred to or acknowledged by the operat-
ing team. In practice there are always time and resource limita-
tions. We cannot include too many people in the analysis process.
The key is to ensure that people with the proper competence take
part and that the risk analysis methodology is adequate and
stimulates the process in the right direction as discussed above.
There is clearly a potential for improvements here.
Item (4) is about compliance, and in many contexts emphasis is
placed on meeting the requirements and procedures deﬁned. Then
the desired results are expected to be met. However, risk problems
are often related to activities where we face large uncertainties; the
systems are complex, and we cannot prescribe exactly what will
happen and make rules on how to meet the scenarios that could
happen. Surprises will occur. We need to acknowledge that risk is
also about surprises relative to our knowledge and beliefs, about the
unforeseen. ‘Risk understanding’ is also about acknowledging this
aspect of risk. The current practice as outlined above basically ignores
this dimension of risk. Decision makers need to take into account
that there are dimensions of risk that are not captured by the risk
analysis, the decision makers cannot condition on assumptions –
they need to look at the “unconditional risk” and see beyond the
conditional risk produced by the risk analysts.
A key tool in this context is the development of methods for
characterising the strength of knowledge on which the risk and
probability assignments are based, which is linked to item (5) in
the above list. Such methods have been studied by, for example,
[27,28,13] and are linked to judgements such as:
1) The degree to which the assumptions made are reasonable/
realistic.
2) The degree to which data/information exist/s and are/is reli-
able/relevant.
3) The degree to which there is disagreement among experts.
4) The degree to which the phenomena involved are understood
and accurate models exist.
Clearly, a high level of ‘risk understanding’ requires that the
knowledge is considered to be strong. It is not possible, nor
meaningful, to develop an exact formula expressing what is strong
and less strong, but some guiding principles and crude score
systems can be formulated as shown in [27,28,13], see also [7].
We have seen that the ‘risk acknowledgement’ term is often
problematic to use in practice, as the risk description does not
provide clear guidance on what is adequate decision making. The
term obviously should be used with care. In cases where the risk
assessments provide strong conﬁdence of severe consequences C,
‘risk acknowledgement’ is about accepting the risk, making the
necessary conclusions and taking action, as highlighted in Section
3. But such cases are not so common. The risks related to severe
consequences are usually small, and the decision making is more
about balancing different concerns than one-dimensional considera-
tions of risk. See Fig. 1, which presents a model for the link between
risk assessment and decision making. The risk assessments use the
evidence and contribute to building a knowledge base, which is
evaluated on the basis of relevant criteria and guidance principles, as
input to the decision making. The ‘risk understanding’ is to a large
extent built on the evidence and the knowledge base components,
whereas the ‘risk acknowledgement’ is mainly linked to the two
remaining components. In the case, for example, of a food safety
issue, the analysts and experts may provide a recommendation on
how to act based on the broad risk evaluation. They may ﬁnd the risk
relatively large – a rather high conﬁdence of severe consequences C –
and recommend measures to be implemented. They acknowledge
the risk and propose actions accordingly.
However, as stressed above, when the message from the risk
assessment is not so clear, the ‘risk acknowledgement’ concept is not
so easy to use. Nonetheless, it can be applied to reﬂect the acknowl-
edgement – the recognition – that we face some type of risk, for





Experts Decision maker 
Fig. 1. A model of the link between risk assessment and decision making, based on
Hansson and Aven [17].
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example risk of surprises related to our knowledge and beliefs, and
that we need to take this seriously, address it and follow it up. The ‘risk
acknowledgement’ does not show a “correct” way of managing the
risk, on how to follow up the risk information and risk assessment
conducted. With this interpretation, both the terms ‘risk understand-
ing’ and ‘risk acknowledgement’ ﬁt into a risk management frame-
work that highlights risk analysis as a tool to get insights and inform
the decision makers and does not prescribe what to do, which for
most situations is the only meaningful way of using risk analysis.
We ﬁnd the ‘risk understanding’ concept useful in this setting,
to capture the fact that one “sees” the relevant aspects of risk: the
events, the consequences, the uncertainties and the background
knowledge on which the judgements made are based. ‘Risk
acknowledgement’ is a more challenging term as its application
needs to be tailored to speciﬁc situations and issues. Yet, we ﬁnd it
useful as a link between the understanding part and the actions.
Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRAs) and Probabilistic Safety
Assessments (PSAs) provide ‘risk understanding’ – justiﬁed beliefs –
by identifying hazardous situations and scenarios that can lead to
severe consequences, by assessing associated uncertainties, and
giving insights about which components/subsystems/sub-activities
that contribute the most to the risk. The understanding obtained
through the events/scenarios generation is often the most important
part of the QRAs/PSAs, as highlighted by for example [3]. The
engineering insights lead in many cases to immediate adjustments
and improvements of the arrangements considered, the risk is
acknowledged and actions taken. Current use of QRAs/PSAs do
therefore contribute to both ‘risk understanding’ and ‘risk acknowl-
edgement’ in particular through the engineering phases. The quanti-
ﬁcation is an important tool in this respect, measuring and
presenting ﬁgures that show the magnitude of the different risk
contributors, but as discussed above there is a potential for improve-
ments in the way the analyses are conducted and the results
visualised, for example linked to the use of strength of knowledge
judgments supporting the probabilities derived.
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